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AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE

STUDENT REPORT

A NEW LOOK AT USAF PUBLIC AFFAIRS
OFFICER MANNING

MAJOR GEORGE W. TITUS 84-2590
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Submitted to the faculty in partial fulfillment of
requirements for graduation.

AIR COMMAND AND STAFF COLLEGE
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20. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse side if necessary and identify by block number) <p>The study compares the USAF policy of accessing second lieutenants directly into the public affairs specialty to the policies of the US Army, which draws its PAOs from its operational forces, and the Canadian Armed Forces, which draws the vast majority of its PAOs from its operational forces. Recommended changes to the existing USAF procedures are offered in the final chapter of the study.</p>		

PREFACE

This study is intended to create an interest in re-examining current Air Force procedures concerning public affairs officer manning. Nothing is so perfect that it can't be improved upon, especially when other similar organizations are doing the same thing differently. While the worst reason in the world to do something is because everybody else is doing it that way, sometimes it is enlightening to ascertain why everyone else is doing it that way -- and to remember that the second worst reason for doing something in a particular manner is because it has always been done that way.

One minor caveat to the study: The term "he" is used throughout the report in a generic sense, referring to mankind in general rather than an individual of a particular sex. Using "he/she" is simply too unwieldy and distracting in a report of this length to be practical.

Finally, the terms "public affairs" and "public relations" are used throughout this report, the only difference being who uses the terms and in what setting. As Howard Stephenson notes in his book, Handbook of Public Relations, public affairs and public relations are interchangeable terms, but "public relations, by direction of the U.S. Congress, is never applied to federal service agencies." (12:179)

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Major George W. Titus is a career Air Force officer with over 28 years active service. He enlisted in the Air Force in 1956 and served over 14½ years in an enlisted status prior to obtaining his commission through the Airmen's Education and Commissioning Program in September 1970. Commissioned an administrative officer, Major Titus had assignments in that specialty at Cannon AFB and Kirtland AFB, NM; Kunsan AB, Korea; and Hellenikon AB, Greece. At Hellenikon, he was also the Executive Officer to the Commander and, upon reassignment to Mountain Home AFB, Idaho, became the Squadron Section Commander of the 366th Component Repair Squadron. He entered the public affairs field at Mountain Home and was the Chief of Public Affairs at that installation. He was the Director of Public Affairs at the Headquarters, Air Force Operational Test and Evaluation Center, Kirtland AFB, NM prior to his entering the Air Command and Staff College in August 1983. Major Titus is a graduate of the Defense Information School, Squadron Officers School, and the University of Oklahoma. He is obtaining a masters degree in political science (international relations) through the Auburn University at Montgomery concurrent with his attendance at ACSC.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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REPORT NUMBER 84-2590

AUTHOR(S) MAJOR GEORGE W. TITUS, USAF

TITLE A NEW LOOK AT USAF PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER MANNING

I. Purpose: ^{This document} To examine the present procedures used by the Air Force in accessing new officers into the public affairs career field, compare those procedures against those of similar organizations, and suggest methods for improving the procedures so that the overall mission -- providing quality public affairs service to the USAF and the American taxpayer -- is better served.

II. Problem: At the present time, the Air Force accesses second lieutenants directly from civilian life (through completion of either ROTC or OTS) into the public affairs career field. As a result, such personnel must learn about both the Air Force and the public affairs function at the same time. In the meantime, however, he is an official spokesperson for the Air Force -- regardless of how much he may or may not know about either the Air Force or public affairs.

III. Data: The Air Force alone adheres to such a policy. The U.S. Army and the U.S. Navy obtain their public affairs officers from the ranks of their operational forces. The Canadian Forces obtain approximately 90% of such officers from that same source. The logic is consistent in all cases: The officers must be familiar with their services before they can represent those services to the public. It is the basis for a closely related endeavor: Sales -- and few salesmen can sell a product of which they are not thoroughly knowledgeable. The Air Force theory is

CONTINUED

that second lieutenants will learn from experienced PAOs so that, when they are placed in positions requiring them to represent the Air Force, they will have the ability and experience to do so. But the data does not support that thesis, since second lieutenants are occupying both chief and deputy chief positions throughout the Air Force. Another aspect of the experience deficiency is that Air Force lieutenants usually attend the Defense Information School (DINFOS) enroute to their first duty station. It is one area when Air Force procedures are usually in synchronization with the Army, Navy and Canadian Forces; it is also probably the one area where the Air Force should not be in agreement with its sister organizations. Army, Navy and Canadian Forces personnel, because of their prior military experience, have a basis to which they can relate the training presented; new Air Force lieutenants normally have no such basis. A minimum of six months' commissioned service should be required for attendance at the school so that the training would not be conducted in an experience vacuum and therefore be more meaningful and relevant.

IV. Conclusions: The public affairs program of any organization is a function of the command and, as such, requires the extensive involvement of the commander. That involvement should begin during the PAO assignment process and extend through the training of that PAO. Public affairs is a dynamic, continuous process; a process that requires communication between the principals involved so that communications aimed at specific targets obtains the desired results.

V. Recommendations: Selection, training and education of USAF public affairs officers are facets of a single process, a process that is designed by the Air Force to be of maximum benefit to the Air Force. It is also a process that should be occasionally reviewed and improved upon as appropriate. Changing the present accession policy can be justified; it may not, however, be acceptable. Other alterations -- changing the timing of education, revamping the syllabus of that education, increasing the involvement of the commander in both selection and training, and changing the training to involve a wider segment of the organization -- are all worthy of consideration and relatively inexpensive to adopt. Everything has a time for occurrence; the time for a new look at public affairs officer manning is at hand.

Chapter One

INTRODUCTION

"Everybody is eloquent enough on what he knows."
-Socrates (16:13)

This study is intended to examine the current Air Force policy concerning the officer manning in the public affairs career field. Sources of public affairs officers for the Air Force, recent manning statistics and the current manning posture (as of October 1983) are surveyed and compared to similar factors in the U.S. Army and the Canadian Forces public affairs career fields in the study. A very brief look at public affairs manning in the U.S. Navy is also included.

A prime difference in the manning philosophies of the services examined is that, at the present time, the U.S. Air Force, alone among all services, adheres to a policy of accessing inexperienced second lieutenants into its public affairs program. In maintaining such a policy, the Air Force may not always maximize its opportunities for success in its public affairs endeavors. In a research paper prepared for the Air War College in May 1951 entitled, "The Public and the Air Force," Colonel John D. Nottingham reviewed the importance of the Air Force maintaining good public relations and creating a favorable image of itself in the eyes of the American people. Colonel Nottingham, in a section of the paper subtitled, "Who is Responsible for Public Relations?", quoted Mr. Edward K. Thompson, then managing editor of Life magazine, who had responded to a query about the policy then of the USAF public information program by saying, "All I can suggest is that you staff public relations with the best possible people." (9:25) Whether or not inexperienced second lieutenants meet those qualifications is open to question.

The source for obtaining those "best possible people" is not a subject for debate to the U.S. Army, the U.S. Navy or the Canadian Armed Forces; nor is it a question. According to Major Michael P. Sullivan, the public affairs career monitor at the U.S. Army's Military Personnel Center at Alexandria, Virginia, the public affairs career field is just not an accession skill in that service. Simply stated, that means that nobody enters the Army as a public affairs officer. The accession skills are in one of that service's five combat arms,

five combat service support arms, or five combat support arms specialties (see Figure 1-1). (13:) The public affairs speciality is an additional skill area which an army officer may enter upon completion of at least five years' service in one of the 15 combat arms branches. Major Sullivan, who has a graduate degree in journalism, is a case in point. He was an armored cavalry officer in his previous assignments and is still qualified in that specialty under the Army's dual specialty program.

Figure 1 - 1

U.S. Army Accession Specialties

<u>Combat Arms</u> <u>Branches</u>	<u>Combat Support</u> <u>Arms Branches</u>	<u>Combat Service Support</u> <u>Arms Branches</u>
Armor	Military Police	Adjutant General Corps
Infantry	Corps of Engineers	Finance
Artillery	Signal Corps	Transportation Corps
Air Defense Artillery	Military Intelligence	Quartermaster Corps
Aviation	Chemical Defense	Ordnance

Source: Major M. P. Sullivan
Hq, USA MILPERCEN

The U.S. Navy agrees with its green-suited sister service in this regard since:

It is the general practice to require that an officer selected for the [public affairs] specialty have an minimum of two years' service as a general line officer. This is based on the theory that the public affairs officer must have a thorough knowledge of the Navy to be a successful spokesman for the Navy. (12:243)

In most instances, according to Major Paul Hargraves of the Canadian Forces personnel center at Ottawa, Canada, Canadian Forces public affairs officers are selected using criteria similar to that of the U.S. Army and Navy. Approximately 90% of such officers are selected via reclassification (i.e., from other specialties within the Forces) with the remaining 10% being drawn from applicants from the civilian sector who possess extensive experience similar to the position for which they are selected. (7:) One significant difference between the programs is that there are a total of 43 public affairs officers in the Canadian Forces through the rank of brigadier; (7:) the U.S. Army has 793 such officers. (13:)

In addition to using essentially similar techniques for obtaining their public affairs officers, the U.S. Army and the Canadians also agree that the officers should attend the Defense Information Officer School (DINFOS) at Fort Benjamin Harrison, Indiana, upon entering the field. It is one area which has the complete agreement of the US Air Force, since it also sends its officers to the course, usually when the officers are enroute to their first duty station. The problem with such an arrangement is that the Army and Canadian Officers, with their prior military experience, have a frame of reference to which the material studied can be related; Air Force lieutenants who attend enroute to that first duty assignment have no such reference. Chapter Two of this study will address those manning criteria and the overall philosophy of the Air Force, Army and Canadian Forces public affairs officer manning policies.

Chapter Three will address the overall philosophies of the entire public affairs functions of the three services, all of which, as may be expected, are quite similar in their organization, purpose, directives and goals.

Chapter Four, entitled "Sales and the Public Affairs Officer," will attempt to establish the direct linkage between the Air Force public affairs officer and sales in the three primary categories of the public affairs function: public information (where the Air Force is "sold" to the American and foreign publics), internal (command) information (where the Air Force is "sold" to the people inside the Air Force), and community relations (where the Air Force targets its efforts toward the public, both in the community in which the individual base is located and the American taxpayer in general). The management of various types of situations, from "good news" to disasters, is addressed. As a recent Air Command and Staff College lecturer put it,

There's a lot of information out there. Public opinion may be more important in the 80s than ever before simply because of the amount of it and the accessibility of it via tv. [For the military] it all started with Vietnam and seeing Americans killed every night on the 6 o'clock news.

Chapter Five will conclude this study by drawing from the first four chapters to establish criteria for selecting Air Force public affairs and by recommending changes to the present procedures to further increase the probabilities that maximum benefit will be gained from the efforts of its public affairs officers. A call to re-examine the present procedures, as the title of this study advocates, is the final recommendation.

Chapter Two

PUBLIC AFFAIRS MANNING

The main difference between the Air Force, Army and Canadian Forces public affairs programs is in the basic manning philosophies of the services. Even the philosophy of the U.S. Navy aligns itself on the side of the U.S. Army and the Canadian Forces. It is of significant importance in all areas of public affairs -- but it is particularly obvious when an incident occurs which stirs the interest of the media:

The officer whom the press usually contacts is the public information officer. If he cannot entirely fulfill the requirements of honesty, truthfulness, openness, authoritativeness and realism, it is obvious that something is seriously wrong. (9:26)

Because of the manning differentials between the Air Force and the U.S. Army, both in theory and actual practice, whether the newsman is calling a base (therefore the Air Force) or a post (ergo the Army) will have an impact on the rank of the officer available for contact. There may be other differences as well, but the response "Lieutenant ----- speaking" will not usually indicate that any Army public affairs officer is on the line; it is, however, a fairly common occurrence on many Air Force installations, not only in the continental U.S. but at American bases throughout the world. The chart at Figure 2-1 depicts Air Force public affairs manning by rank; Figure 2-2 displays the same information for the U.S. Army.

Figure 2 - 1

Air Force Public Affairs (79xx) Manning

(Second Lieutenant - Lieutenant Colonel)

	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Asgd</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>% manning structure</u>
Lieutenant colonel	109	90	83	17.4
Major	167	105	63	20.3
Captain	201	178	89	34.4
Lieutenants (both)	47	144	306	27.8

Source: Lt Col Ted Tilma
AFMPC Palace PA

Figure 2 - 2

U.S. Army Public Affairs Manning

(Captain - Colonel)

	<u>Assigned</u>	<u>Percentage of Manning Structure</u>
Colonel	46	5.8
Lieutenant colonel	170	21.5
Major	350	44.2
Captain	225	28.4

Source: Major M. P. Sullivan
Hq USA MILPERCEN

Providing the manning of any function, of course, is a dynamic process. The preceeding charts are snapshots of the status on a given date in October 1983. The sources of the supply which are required to maintain those functions are germane to this discussion and are as different as the uniforms in which the individual services drape their members.

U.S. ARMY PUBLIC AFFAIRS MANNING

The U.S. Army, as mentioned briefly in the preceeding chapter, does not obtain public affairs officers through its recruiting process, at least not the recruiting which is done at the local post office in the civilian sector. Army officers are first members of the fight force (see Figure 1-1). They are personally familiar with their service and its mission for the simply reason that they have been involved in accomplishing many aspects of that mission, both in the environment where it is done and at the level at which it is performed. Sometimes that environment and level are fairly close to being synonomous, in a foxhole in the case of the infantry, for example, or as an adjutant general corps officer (i.e., an administrative officer) with a line combat unit. One thing is certain: it would be outside the public affairs realm. They have, therefore, seen the Army through a different lens and in a different light. In other words, they have been where the action of their service occurs; they know of which they speak. That system, according to the book, Public Relations, is as it should be:

The necessity for a thorough understanding of the internal workings of an organization can hardly be overemphasized. . . . The inner workings must be known and recognized for what they are worth to assure the success of a public relations program. (8:374)

During the twelve months which preceeded October 1983 (the date the data was obtained), 143 officers were accepted into the U.S. Army's public affairs program. Approximately 55% of that group had accession specialities in the combat arms branches with the remaining 45% split almost exactly evenly between the combat support arms (22%) and combat services support arms (23%) branches. From 75 to 80% of those in the latter group were from the adjutant general corps. (13:)

Under the Army's dual specialty system, all line officers are required to obtain second specialty codes by the time they have eight years of commissioned service, the window for selection being between the fifth and eighth years of commissioned service. The officers can select their preferences, have it awarded to them by directive (due to specific qualifications identified by the command), or they can have it awarded to them by their commander, usually due to a demonstrated proficiency or specialized training (such as a degree in journalism for those entering the public affairs field). When fully qualified in the public affairs specialty, the officer can elect to discard his accession specialty and carry only the public affairs specialty code. There is a price for such a selection, however, as promotions can be earned under both the accession and additional skills for dual-qualified officers; single specialty officers can compete only in their one skill. Since Army promotion boards are provided promotion quotas by specialty -- and must explain to U.S. Army Headquarters for failing to follow such guidance -- the price for such selection is potentially high indeed. (13:) Considering that the "window" for selecting the secondary specialty begins at the five years' commissioned service point and promotion to captain occurs at the four years' service point, all Army public affairs officers are, as shown in Figure 2-2, at least in the grade of captain.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS FUNDING CAP

The dual-specialty system used by both the U.S. Army and the U.S. Navy has the added benefit of avoiding the funding cap Congress has placed on the community relations and media relations aspects of public affairs. The limitation, which has haunted the Air Force since Congress initiated it back in the early seventies, applies to the entire Department of Defense and is annually "shredded out" to the individual services by the Office of the Secretary of Defense Public Affairs. (6:)* The cap applies to all public affairs personnel

* Note: All information concerning the Air Force's "trials and tribulations" with the funding cap were obtained from Lt Col S. S. Duncan, SAF/PAX, in a telecon on Jan. 4, 1984.

who devote at least 50% of their duties in direct contact in the controlled areas. To the Army, which strives for a 50-50 mix in time allocation between accession and public affairs career fields, (13:) the cap is not even a factor. Nor is it a factor to the Navy, which also adheres to the dual-specialty system. To the Air Force, with its single track specialty, the cap is a continual area of concern.

Approximately \$8.8 million is the authorization for use in the controlled areas in Fiscal Year 1984, a figure which equates to 323 officer/enlisted positions, according to Lieutenant Colonel Duncan. This figure has the effect of a checking account; when the authorization is attained, no further endeavors can be initiated and activities in the controlled areas must cease. Any expansions, such as the opening of a new office or an increase in activities in the community relations/media relations areas, must be drawn from existing resources -- or not done at all. An example of the impact is a contemplated tour to Europe of the U.S. Air Force Demonstration Team, The Thunderbirds. Past tours, such as the European tour in 1974, have been paid for by public affairs funds; but The Thunderbird shows are classified as community relations activities and are thus subject to the funding cap.

SAF/PAX personnel are attempting to alleviate the funding cap problem along three different avenues of endeavor. The short term "fix" is to "scrub" the list of positions charged against capped activities to insure that only those personnel who have direct contact are including in the accounting. One example: the removal from the list of a computer operator who supports the Hometown News Program. No direct contact, hence doesn't belong on the list. A longer term resolution is to increase the proportion which is the cutoff for inclusion in the controlled area from 50 to 65%. Congress, since it imposed the cap and set the guidelines for its computation, will have to approve any change in the percentage factor to be used. Congress is also the agency which will have to approve the third path being pursued: the plan to change the computation from finance-based -- and subject to the whims of the inflationary spiral -- to man-year based, which would eliminate the ebb and flow of inflation and allow the application of more constant management principles.

CANADIAN FORCES PUBLIC AFFAIRS MANNING

Canadian Forces public affairs manning is similar to that of the U.S. Army except, of course, much smaller in numbers (see Figure 2-3). Like the Army, the Canadian Forces depend upon transfers from operational specialties for their public affairs personnel.

Figure 2 - 3

Canadian Forces Public Affairs Manning

<u>Rank</u>	<u>Auth</u>	<u>Asgn</u>	<u>Remarks</u>
Brigadier General	1	1	Director General for Information; can be any classification; not established for public affairs specialty
Colonel	1	1	
Lieutenant colonel	4	7	Three assigned as: * Press secretary to the Prime Minister * Press secretary to Minister of National Defence * One employed out of classification
Major	17	17	
Captain/Lieutenant	21	21	

Source: Major P. N. Hargraves
NDHQ, Ottawa, Canada

The Public Affairs (PAff) classification is composed of officers who have transferred [sic] from other operational or support classifications. Ideally, these officers should have between seven and twelve years experience, excluding pre-commissioning education time (ROTP, OCTP, UTPM). This condition may be waived in the case of certain candidates who possess unique qualifications required to fulfill specific requirements within the classification. (1:.../2)*

Since potential PAff officers, for the most part, have already demonstrated their abilities to function effectively in the Canadian Forces, the most obvious yet most important factor to be considered prior to their being selected for transfer/acceptance into the PAff is their ability to perform well as PAff officers. To this end, prospective candidates undergo a period of preselection assessment in the Directorate

* During the 12-month period preceeding October 1983, eleven officers were accessed into the PAff. Eight of those officers were reclassified; the remaining three were direct accessions from the civilian sector. (7:)

of Information Services and the Directorate of Exhibitions and Displays. (1:.../2) The process is neither haphazard nor left to the discretion of the reviewing individual:

This pre-selection period will range from 16 to 24 weeks. . . . At the conclusion of that period a Board of officers will convent to review the candidate's performance and determine their suitability for employment in the PAff classification. The Board will reach one of the following conclusions:

- a. That the candidate be accepted into the PAff classification;
- b. That the candidate undergo an additional eight weeks assessment to correct weaknesses noted during the initial period; or,
- c. That the candidate be referred to DCPCO for further career action due to unsuitability for employment in the PAff classification. (1:.../3)

Providing they are accepted in the PAff classification, Canadian public affairs officers are assigned to the National Defense Headquarters at Ottawa or to "DND Office of Information at Halifax, Montreal, Toronto, North Bay, Winnipeg, Edmonton, and Esquimalt [Canada] or Lahr, [Federal Republic of] Germany." (1:66-1-1)

U.S. AIR FORCE PUBLIC AFFAIRS MANNING

The U.S. Air Force process for recruiting and selecting its new public affairs officers is not nearly so dependent on officers already on board serving in other specialties. As indicated in Figure 2-4, the majority enter the Air Force directly from civilian life for the specific purpose of becoming public affairs officers.

Figure 2 - 4

Second Lieutenant Accessions

<u>Fiscal Year</u>	<u>OTS</u>	<u>ROTC</u>	<u>Total</u>
1979	50	28	78
1980	49	7	56
1981	20	15	35
1982	1	16	17
1983	7	23	30
1984 (projected)	12	14	26

Source: Lt Col Ted Tilma
AFMPC Palace PA

The picture presented in the above statistics has potentially serious inherent deficiencies. The officers obtained through ROTC have no active duty experience and, in the vast majority of cases, know nothing about the Air Force except what they have seen and experienced in an academic environment or during their summer encampment program between their sophomore and junior years of college. The inputs provided by Officers Training School (OTS) have even less first hand knowledge since, except for those individuals with prior enlisted service, they have as little as 90 days total military experience. With this base of knowledge to draw upon, the lieutenants become official spokespersons of the United States Air Force. Normally, they are assigned to positions where they can gain experience, when they can find out what the "real Air Force" is all about. Normally, that's the program, but as Figure 2-5 shows, that's not always the case.

Figure 2 - 5

Positions Occupied by Second Lieutenants by Major Command

Command	March 1982			March 1983		
	C h i e f	D e p u t y	O t h e r	C h i e f	D e p u t y	O t h e r
Military Airlift Command	0	2	4	0	2	2
Strategic Air Command	0	11	6	1	9	1
Tactical Air Command	1	8	4	1	9	1
Pacific Air Force	0	0	1	0	1	1
US Air Forces Europe	4	1	0	1	0	0
AF Systems Command	0	0	9	0	0	6
AF Logistics Command	0	1	6	0	0	3
Air Training Command	0	3	3	3	2	2
Other	0	2	6	1	0	4
Totals	5	28	39	7	23	20

Source: US Air Force Public
Affairs Directories
dated March 1982/83

The second lieutenants occupying Chief of Public Affairs and Deputy Chief positions reflected in the above are spread throughout the Air Force and around the world. Deputy chiefs are included in this discussion because, when the chief is not around, the deputy must assume his position and is, occasionally at least, "boss." The individuals occupying those positions may well be accomplishing their duties in a highly satisfactory manner. In fact, they more than likely are and, additionally, getting better at their tasks everyday as their experiences continually re-orient the learning curve upward. But public affairs is an arena where opportunity is a major player and opportunities, unlike the postman in the literary classic, seldom ring twice; like time, once past they are gone forever. A similar event may occur, but the one missed is simply history. There are no "instant replays" in real life, no "stop-action freezes" to allow the stage to be restructured. A famous, if extreme, example:

In Vietnam, we were never successful in creating public understanding of our policy or its execution, and public opposition simply forced the Government to abandon its program. Vietnam is the classic case where public opinion, public reaction, in due time, forced a major reversal . . . in Government action. (15:42)

Vietnam was, as stated, an extreme example (and involved much more than just public affairs, obviously), but mistakes are made, to err is human; in the Air Force, the selection process is at least partly responsible. The commander has the responsibility to select as his public affairs officer the individual most qualified by Air Force knowledge, experience, aptitude, and interest. (4:10) Occasionally that occurs, but usually the entrant into the public affairs specialty is a second lieutenant (see Figure 2-5) who owes his selection to a board convened at Randolph AFB, Texas. The selection is based on such items as letters of recommendation, college grade point averages, and civilian experience factors, if any. (13:) The U.S. Army, as detailed in Chapter 2, obtains its PAOs from its combat branches, all of whom have at least five years active duty as a line officer. The Canadian Forces follow a similar process but add a four to six-month mandatory observation period, whatever the source, to insure that the individual has the ability to function successfully in the public affairs specialty. (1:.../2) While under assessment, each candidate's performance is assessed and registered on a PUBLIC AFFAIRS CLASSIFICATION PRE-SELECTION BOARD RECORD OF ASSESSMENT (Annex B). (1:.../4) The factors considered in that assessment are listed at Annex A, factors which are not taken lightly, as reflected in the following extract from the Canadian Forces Public Affairs Training Compendium:

Consequence of Error: Error on the part of the Public Affairs Officer may:

- a. bring discredit to the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces;
- b. jeopardize military operations;
- c. jeopardize security by injudicious release;
- d. cause inaccurate assessment and misinterpretation of public attitudes and reactions;
- e. result in adverse public reaction to DND and CF programs;
- f. be detrimental to morale;
- g. disrupt proceedings of official events;
- h. result in personal liability;
- j. waste material and/or public funds;
- k. result in death or injury to personnel. (1:66-1-2)

SELECTED CASE HISTORIES

The Canadian points are well taken, as a review of selected case histories attests. In December 1975, the alleged chief of the American CIA at Athens, Greece, an individual assigned to the US. Embassy at Athens, was assassinated. Embassy information personnel responded to queries from the world press concerning the incident, but the task of providing information to the Army, Navy and Air Force personnel on assignment in the area fell to the Air Force public affairs officer, a second lieutenant. The task was complicated by nerves of locally assigned personnel already rubbed raw by recent terrorist activities in the area, activities which included the firebombing of American-owned automobiles, as many as 12 or 13 in a single evening. The individual tried, just as he did in all his efforts, but within six months the individual had been passed over for promotion to first lieutenant and subsequently released from active duty.

Sometimes the identification of substandard performance takes longer. A captain assigned to Greenham Common, England, an installation which has received large amounts of worldwide publicity because of the ground-launched cruise missiles which are being stationed there, against which large numbers of demonstrators make their presence all too well known, was also recently released from active duty when he failed to be selected for promotion. (10:) A captain at a Military Airlift Command installation was relieved from duty as a PAO and assigned duties elsewhere on the installation. The reason for his "career-broadening opportunity" was that he failed to do what is applicable to any staff officer: "Whenever a commander states a problem or whenever a problem needs [the commander's] decision, approach him with the analysis of the problem and the recommendation for solving it." (3:10-17) Or, stated another way, "the PAO must solve problems and not present them for solution." (3:10-19)

The public affairs officer at a Tactical Air Command installation, also a captain, retired not long ago, more than likely in lieu of being fired, after spending the better part of two years watching the wing commander act as his own PAO and he, the captain (and his entire public affairs staff), being deliberately cut out of the pattern regardless of the activity.

Those examples are illustrations of communication between two individuals, the commander and his public affairs officer, short-circuiting; they are not the type relationships which should be allowed to exist between such individuals. The PAO works for the commander as a key member of the special staff. (4:10) He serves as staff counsel on public affairs matters and organizes, directs and operates the public affairs program. (4:10) Ideally, the PAO should be the most knowledgeable individual on the staff. He must have broad, in-depth knowledge of the organization, the policies, and the strategic and tactical doctrines of his service. (3:10-15) He must know who makes things work in the command and establish contacts with those key personnel, but above all, he must not only know his position and play it well, he must also be a team player. (3:10-15)

The PAO must have all of those attributes and more. As Nielander and Miller state, the public relations "program must start from the very top level of management. When it is carried out . . . without the support of the "brass," . . . [it] seldom works." (8:23) The Lockhart Report observation, unfortunately, can still be found in today's Air Force:

One difficulty is that officers who are trained to make quick decisions involving the life and death of men and the fate of their country, and to readily assume responsibility, often fear "sticking out their neck" [sic] when it comes to public relations. This hesitancy may come from a lack of confidence by Army officers in getting the same support from superiors in public relations matters that they expect in combat situations. They should be able to expect to be backed up for action . . . in public relations as well as in other military duties. (9:39)

Sometimes, though, it is simply a matter of a lack of confidence not in his superiors but in the public affairs officer with whom he has to work which bothers the commander. In those instances, the deficiency becomes all the more obvious because of the rank disparity between his PAO and the other officers in his immediate staff. The difference is noticeable when the PAO is a captain; when he is a second lieutenant, it is glaringly apparent and serves only to compound the problem in all but a very few instances.

With just as few exceptions, experience, particularly Air Force experience, can make up for such deficiencies.

Successful public affairs programs are not punched from pre-cut molds nor the result of mechanical implementation of regulation-mandated procedures. They are instead the result of, as a former instructor at the Tactical Air Command's NCO Academy phrased it, "listening with the third ear and seeing with the third eye." Successful programs require knowing the mission of not only the unit for which the public affairs program is being designed, but also the missions of the other units involved and how the commanders concerned see those involvements. It can take form in a planning meeting for an event in which the unit the PAO represents has never participated. Instead of simply listening to the rehash of last year's operation plan, the successful PAO sees an opportunity and devises a plan of positive participation by his unit. Such programs, to be effective, mean fully supporting and implementing the word and spirit of the Air Force philosophy of public affairs. That philosophy is covered in the next chapter of this study as it is compared to the programs and philosophies of the U.S. Army and the Canadian Armed Forces.

Chapter Three

THE USAF, U.S. ARMY AND CANADIAN FORCES PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAMS

The United States Air Force, United States Army and Canadian Forces public affairs programs, as would be expected, are very similar in their organization, purpose and goals. The basic idea behind the Army Information Program is that "the Army's business is the peoples' business . . . we have an Army Information Program because free people have an inherent right to be informed about this arm of their government." (15:15) The Air Force states it a little differently, but the effect is similar: "The Air Force Public Affairs Program was established to increase the public's understanding and knowledge of the Air Force mission and needs." (4:6) The Canadians go into a little more detail, but essentially are in concert with their American counterparts:

Public affairs is the management function which communicates information about an organization to the public, evaluates public attitudes, identifies the policies and procedures of an organization with the public interest, and executes a program of action which includes media relations to keep the public informed. (1:66-1-1)

Organizationally, all three services are aligned into three basic categories with the Air Force adding two others, but more as subsets than as differing structures: internal (or Command) information, media relations and community relations are the three divisions common to all the services. The Air Force adds two supporting functions to its organizational structure, Plans and Resource Management and Security and Policy Review.

THE U.S. ARMY PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAM

The U.S. Army depicts its overall public affairs program schematically as a pyramid:




Figure 3 - 1

The U.S. Army Public Affairs Program (3:11-8)

Colonel Nottingham, in his War College paper, quotes Mr. Robert P. Patterson, (then) Secretary of War, in an address to the Army Information School at Carlisle, PA, concerning the Army's public information program:

Nor is there any reason why the Army should want to conceal the facts from the people. Our record will bear the closest scrutiny, not only now but since the Army's beginning. Our record, in peace as in war, is a proud one. The public knows it. It also knows that we are human, that we make mistakes. I have always been interested and somewhat amused at the efforts that are taken, when a complaint comes in, to justify -- always justify -- what has been done, no matter how fantastic the account may sound to the listener, or may read, if it's in a letter, to the reader. Infinitely better to say that a blunder was made, that measures have been taken to prevent its recurrence, with regrets and the assurance that every effort will be made not to have it happen again. You do not need to apologize for the Army. The American people will give the Army sympathetic understanding so long as the Army provides them the honest, intelligent information. (9:25)

The comments of Secretary Patterson were made on November 6, 1946 but still reflect the overall Army policy concerning its attitude toward the public's right to know. The November 1982 U.S. Army Command and General Staff College Reference Book on the Army Public Affairs Program is a more current reference, but the message hasn't changed:

In dealing with news media representatives, the single most important rule for the Army spokesman is rigid, honesty. There are never any circumstances that justify the telling of a conscious, intentional untruth concerning the Army. (9:16)

The Army's Command (internal) Information program has both recognized formal and informal aspects, with efforts designed to appeal to both channels. The first, originally called troop information and education (TI&E), created unpleasant memories that are evidently still all too vivid to many members of today's Army.

Some things were done in that old program that should not have been done at all or should have been done differently . . . and some of its worst features caused actual harm to the Army. . . . [T]he original TI&E effort had two main faults: (1) It concentrated upon broad world affairs subjects while neglecting subjects of direct interest and concern to the . . . individual soldier; (2) The Army tried to exercise detailed and direct supervision . . . from the Washington level. (9:19)

The purpose of the formal Command Information program is to motivate the individual soldiers. The theory is that well informed and well motivated soldiers talk about the Army at least as often and as convincingly as badly informed and badly motivated soldiers do. (9:20)

That's the formal side of the program; the informal side of Command Information consists of activities and materials which enable the individual soldier to "acquire information on his own volition in his leisure time. . . . Examples are the . . . unit newspaper and the official Army monthly magazine, SOLDIERS." (9:21)

The purpose of the Army's Community Relations Program is to develop and maintain harmony and mutually beneficial relationships between Army communities and neighboring civilian communities. (9:23) The Lockhart Report, prepared in 1946 by Mr. Jack H. Lockhart of the Scripps-Howard Newspapers at the request of Major General Floyd L. Parks, (then) Director, War Department Bureau of Public Relations, reported the results of a survey of the efficiency and serviceability of

the bureau. One of its findings was that "all any public relations . . . can do, in the long run, is present the Army as it is, not as it ought to be or would like to be. No more than that can be expected or achieved." (9:23)

THE USAF PUBLIC AFFAIRS PROGRAM

The goal of the Air Force Public Affairs Program is in line with the philosophy of the Lockhart Report. The program's officially worded purpose is "to increase the public's understanding and knowledge of the Air Force mission and needs." (4:6) Its objectives are:

- a. To assist the American people . . . in their understanding of:
 - (1) Threats to the U.S. . . . and the need . . . to be alert against potential aggression.
 - (2) The relationship of the Air Force to other U.S. armed services.
 - (3) The day-to-day activities of the Air Force.
 - (4) The need for . . . modernization of Air Force systems.
 - (5) The need to attract and retain qualified personnel.
 - (6) (Its) essential role . . . in international relations. (4:6)

Like its sister service the U.S. Army, the Air Force public affairs program

is subdivided into the three major functions of internal information, media relations, and community relations. In addition, plans and resource management, and security and policy review activities strongly affect public affairs functions. (4:6)

The prime goal of internal information is to keep personnel fully informed so that the end result is high morale, higher productivity, and retention. (4:21) The base newspaper, the prime product of each base public affairs office's internal information staff, is a principal medium for disseminating special service news and information to support the program. (4:22) But, while the public affairs officer and his staff produce the base newspaper, patiently (and sometimes not so patiently) striving each week to meet the deadline for its publication with varied material specifically designed to appeal to the different segments of its readership, the publication does not "belong" to the public affairs officer; it "belongs" to the commander. A basic tenet of Air Force policy is that public affairs is a function of the command, (4:10) and the command is responsible

for releasing information to the public. (4:56) A unit newspaper, however, that airmen do not read, or if read do not believe, is worse than a waste of money and manpower -- it is a missed opportunity by the commander to communicate with his men. (15:21) Morale, productivity and retention are all likely to suffer in such situations.

IMPORTANCE OF THE MEDIA

Interacting with commercial newspapers, as well as other segments of the public mass communication field, are the functions of the media relations segment of the Air Force public relations program. As an instrument of the American people, the Air Force and its activities are open to public scrutiny. The Air Force must explain what it does, why it does it, and how it does it. (4:56) The Air Force's ability to carry out its mission depends on its ability to communicate its accomplishments, problems and needs to the public. (4:56) However, relations between commanders and the press are not always that of a cozy companionship. Actually, resentment against the press by the military emerged during the Korean War and surged during the Vietnam conflict. (15:27) The military complained that the Vietnam War was not reported accurately or fairly and that distortions unjustly subjected the defense establishment to ridicule and disrespect. (15:28) Colonel Nottingham reported similar feelings in his 1951 study:

Recently, an Air Force colonel remarked, "If I had my way, I'd keep all newspaper reporters off my base -- you can't trust 'em . . . I might even order my air police after them, and tell 'em to knock their heads together and kick 'em off the base." (9:10)

The need for evaluating the press is not a new phenomenon. Thomas Jefferson, back in 1787, said that

the good sense of the people is a country's best defense, and although the people might sometimes be led astray for the moment, they would soon correct themselves. The way to prevent these irregular interpositions of the people is to give them full information of their affairs through the channel of the public papers and to contrive so that those papers should penetrate the whole mass of the people. The basis of our government being the opinion of the people, the very first object should be to keep that right. If it were left to me to decide whether we should have a government without newspapers or newspapers without a government, I should not hesitate a moment to prefer the latter. (9:22)

Fortunately, the Air Force is getting smarter and, although there are those who still don't consider the media as advocates of the military's position or agree fully with Jefferson's opinion, at least most agree that, as Nielander and Miller put it, "the surest way to create suspicion is to withhold information that should be available to the public." (8:23) Stated another way, "human craving for information and passing on knowledge creates a vacuum that has to be filled," (14:31) a need particularly true in today's media-conscious world where television news is presented literally 24 hours a day and ratings reflecting viewership is often of greater concern than news accuracy. A recent speaker on the ACSC stage summarized that view by saying, "Television reports the news. If they can't get the story, they fabricate it." Maybe, but the military has a responsibility to inform and to be responsive and accessible; it is not correct that the press always takes an adversary relationship with the government. (15:33) It is the function of the public affairs officer and his commander to accomplish its goal; to tell its story by furnishing the pertinent facts without self-serving elaboration or evasion. (15:16) The Lockhart study said it this way:

If the Air Force is good, the story will be good -- and public relations will be good. If the Air Force is bad, the story will be bad and the result bad. In the end, public opinion about the Air Force reflects what the Air Force itself is. That is the whole secret of Air Force public relations. (9:60)

"LESSONS LEARNED" SOMETIMES AREN'T

At times, the Air Force forgets the advice offered in the Lockhart Report and goes about re-inventing the wheel. Official policy is, "when bad news strikes, release it quickly and candidly. Experience proves candor is best." (3:25-I-1) Policy and execution are sometimes more equal the second time around, however. Witness the case of the Air Force Academy "cheating scandals," parts I and II.

The first incident occurred in January 1965. A brief release was issued about the situation, a release which ended by saying, "In order not to compromise the investigation, the Academy will not release details until the investigation is complete." (3:25-I-2) And it didn't. Eventually,

the Secretary of the Air Force sent a colonel to the Academy to assist . . . The press assumed that the outsider was there . . . to give a high level "snow job." The situation became ridiculous . . . [and] the story drudged on for over three weeks. When the final stories were filed it was obvious that the Academy had "muddled through the incident." (3:25-I-4)

Changes occurred within the Academy, including the assignment of a new public affairs officer and the initiation of a community relations branch in the public affairs office. Several initiatives were developed and implemented; a new attitude was created.

In February 1967, a second cheating incident erupted. But this time, no attempt was made to "cover up" any information and updated releases were given all interested media as the investigation proceeded. The releases caused a stir of controversy across the nation. Governmental officials, media and the general public responded with varying degrees of concern. Overall, however, the reaction from the public was sympathetic. The entire incident covered only seven days. (3:25-I-4)

Mr. Barry Zonthian, in a lecture presented to the Naval War College, said, "there is a variation of 'Murphy's Law' that applies -- if you do not take the initiative and do it the right way, any bad information is going to come out and may be surfaced in the worst possible manner and in the most damaging form." (15:40) All of the details eventually surfaced in the Academy's first cheating incident in 1965, but it was "hot copy" for three weeks. All of the details of the Titan missile incident at Damascus, Arkansas, eventually were released, but, "I can neither confirm nor deny," was the only response public affairs personnel were allowed to provide media queries for days. Meanwhile, almost irrefutable proof abounded to all who bothered to review even the sketchy details that were available in the area around the incident site that a nuclear warhead was involved. The public statements issued by Air Force officials strained credibility and were reflected in blazing headlines across the nation's newspapers and in echoing quotes on evening news telecasts. Official Air Force policy in that regard has now also been changed to give on-scene commanders more latitude in such incidents so that the next such event, if there is one, has at least a chance for being a plus for the Air Force, not a minus. As stated, sometimes the Air Force is very guilty of re-inventing the wheel; of having policy equate to execution only on the second time around.

As the above examples illustrate, media relations are sometimes difficult to separate from community relations, the goal of which is to develop and carry out a program of action to earn understanding, acceptance, and support of the Air Force role in national defense. (4:83) The Air Force is concerned with community relations because it depends not only on equipment, but its people as well as the public in general to perform and support the Air Force mission. (4:83) The roots of attitudes and opinions of that public are in the local community. (4:83) Colonel Nottingham, over 30 years ago, wrote the definitive justification for such an effort, a justification that is still current:

Public relations can be defined as the management function which evaluates public attitudes, identifies the policy and procedures of an individual or organization with the public interest and executes a program of action to earn public understanding and acceptance. . . . [It] means that the military must take its place in, and become closely associated with, the civilian community in which it lives. . . . Much . . . can be accomplished in carrying on an interchange of genuine friendly and neighborly relationship with the civilian elements of the overall community without danger to our security. After all, the people of the United States, as taxpayers, support and own the Armed Forces. As members of the Air Force we serve the people of our democracy, and upon them and their good opinion depend to a large degree the morale and efficiency of the USAF. We must take the lead in stimulating community good will and interest in the Air Force. (9:31)

CANADIAN FORCES PUBLIC AFFAIRS

The Canadian Forces public affairs community relations programs are similar in nature and function to the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force programs already described -- and, in fact, at times duplicate the words written by Colonel Nottingham. Their goal is "to encourage mutual understanding and acceptance [of the Canadian Forces] within the military and civilian communities." (1:66-2-6) Resources available to accomplish that goal include speakers bureaus, bands and facilities. Effective implementation requires knowledge of both the military resources available for use and the target audience of the endeavor. (1:66-2-7) In other words, the same factors which have been described above must be considered.

The Canadian Forces public affairs officers learn the details of their craft at the Defense Information School (DINFOS), (1:66-2-1) as do public affairs personnel of all the American armed services. There can be little difference in programs when the implementers have all been taught from the same lectern and learn from the same primer.

Chapter Four

SALES AND THE PUBLIC AFFAIRS OFFICER

In accomplishing the goals inherent in the public affairs philosophies described in chapter three of this study, a large amount of publicity, advertising, marketing and sales are required. Close analysis, however, will reveal that almost all of it is actually sales. Public affairs officers who are assigned to the Publicity and Advertising Departments of the various regional recruiting offices around the country are directly involved in sales -- as are the vast majority of all public affairs officers. Nielander and Miller wrote, "The art of publicity may be defined as information which is spoken, written, printed or otherwise expressed, issued to secure public attention." (8:299) By at least one definition, both advertising and publicity are of the same mold:

The essential difference between advertising and publicity lies in the fact that an advertisement is a prepared message presented, paid for, and controlled by its sponsor. Publicity includes information which is accepted and disseminated by any medium without cost to the beneficiary. In short, since it appears as news, and news cannot be purchased, publicity may be considered as advertising which cannot be purchased. (8:300)

Public affairs and its relations with advertising and publicity then can be established, but the connection may require refinement for clarity. The Handbook of Public Relations does just that:

Public relations and advertising are not parties to a forced marriage or even a marriage of convenience. Nor are they identical twins who merely wear different clothes. They are more like college roommates, wearing each other's coats and ties on occasion, dating the same girls once in a while, but alike in their loyalty to alma mater. Public relations relates not only to advertising, but also to sales, sales promotion, market research -- all the components of the modern concept of marketing goods and services. (12:15)

THE MUSTANG: A CASE HISTORY

Proof of the connection is provided by a review of the Ford Motor Company's Mustang automobile case history.

Public relations for a major corporation is more than dealing with social issues and political problems, interesting and challenging though this may be. Public relations is also concerned with emphasizing the positive accomplishments of a company. The introduction of a new product, if done properly, can be one of those experiences -- especially if it's an exciting new automobile. This case study deals with how Ford public relations played a role in the introduction of a new automobile which helped to revolutionize the United States sports car market.

This automobile was literally created out of market research studies that indicated that there was a market looking for a product. Various sociological and economic studies showed that young people were becoming a significant percentage of our population and a dominant influence. Young people were also becoming better educated -- and college graduates buy more cars. The population had money to spend and the trend to multiple-car families, including emphasis on sports cars, was increasing. Finally, research indicated that the automobile had to have versatility in performance and appointments and, above all, a backseat and a trunk. The answer: the Mustang!

Ford established a small task force to work on the planning and development of the Mustang. Included were market researchers, product planners, stylists, engineers, production people and public relations personnel.

Months in advance of the car's introduction, the public relations department made initial approaches to such magazines as Time, Life, Newsweek, Look, Esquire, Business Week and Sports Illustrated. As Mr. Heft, director of Ford's public information office, put it, "We told them we thought we had something going that would set the auto business on its ear, and would appreciate a chance to tell them about it."

.....

The results were excellent. Ford had simultaneous cover stories in Time and Newsweek. Time carried an eleven-page spread. Both Life and Look ran two-page spreads with several photographs. Esquire devoted three pages to the story -- two in full color; and Sports Illustrated ran five pages. Major cover-

age was also received in Business Week, US News & World Report, Popular Science, Popular Mechanics and Playboy. And, of course, the automotive magazines such as Road and Track, Car Life and Hot Rod gave the Mustang a very big play. Car Life alone used twenty-two photographs and other art work. In all, major stories were placed in magazines with a total circulation of approximately thirty million and a combined readership in excess of that. . . . Before the year was over, more than 419,000 Mustangs were sold -- a record for a new model. (12:399-400)

IT'S ALL SALES

The Air Force, of course, does not have a "bottom line" of profit determination with which the Ford Motor Company's success is rated, but its public affairs officers are involved in sales just as heavily as the showroom employees at the local Ford distributorship. The products being sold fall into two general categories: The first is the Air Force itself; the second are the people who comprise it. The targets of the sales programs are the stockholders and the members of the United States Air Force.

The stockholders in this case are the citizens of the United States who pay the expenses of maintaining the Air Force -- and, as such, have a right to information about its activities. All U.S. Armed Forces share the responsibility and the heritage. General William C. Westmoreland, former U.S. Army Chief of Staff, said, "The Army is a cross-section of our free society [and] every citizen is a stockholder." (5:5) The entire community relations program, as detailed in the preceeding chapter of this study, is aimed at satisfying the requirement. But sales, in general, is a target-specific program; different things for different people. Or, in the vernacular of the profession, segmentized into its various publics, which in itself presents yet another requirement, for "of equal importance to an understanding of the organization is a complete knowledge of the public or publics that will be beneficiaries of the program. It is literally impossible to know too much about a public." (8:374) Base open houses are aimed at several of those publics: Those people who are interested in the Air Force, aircraft or weaponry in general, the base, or the people on the base. An appearance by the USAF Aerial Demonstration Team, The Thunderbirds, at the open house enlarges the audience and appeals to other publics. The US Army Parachute Team, the Golden Knights, appeals to still others, the different appeals overlapping in concentric circles just as any well designed sales campaign is supposed to accomplish. The program and its desired effect

are not exactly new phenomena. Colonel Fred M. Dean in 1951 wrote:

Public opinion is one of the most important factors effecting [sic] war planning. If the public is unaware of the important role of the Air Force, or is not in deepest sympathy with our efforts . . . makes the difference between obsolete equipment or modern aircraft. It's just that simple. (9:20)

Both the public relations aspect of the Mustang development and Colonel Dean's observations involve the public; internal information is aimed at members of the Air Force, the second line of the public affairs program's double-pronged sales effort. Morale, elan and esprit are factors involved in every military function -- and are the very reasons often cited for individuals joining the military in the first place. Creating and maintaining those vital intangibles are the basis for the internal information program, keeping everyone concerned (active duty, reserves, national guard, civilians and family members) informed of the activities of both the unit and the individuals themselves. Public affairs is an essential part of the process, in effect, selling the Air Force to its own people. Retention of qualified personnel depends on such a program just as recruiting is dependent upon advertising to attract recruits in the first place. The Air Force could not long function without its career force, if for no other reason than it couldn't afford the expense of training a whole new force every four years. Public affairs acts as the interpreter for the commander in carrying out this function, (3:17-4) but, as William I. Greener, deputy director of the Ford 1976 Presidential Campaign, points out,

You can't sell bad dog food with good public affairs. Your public affairs message will not be any better or worse than the product you represent, your institution or department. (3:28-16)

But the point is, it's all sales.

Chapter Five

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

CONCLUSIONS

Despite the guidance, education and support provided to and/or concerning public affairs programs, their actual implementation -- in any service, any situation, and any community -- is a function of the individuals concerned. As stated in Chapter One of this study, public affairs is a responsibility of the command, but the commander often has little impact on who is assigned to his public affairs office, even at the major command level. (10:) At base level, as indicated in Chapter Two and as dramatically revealed by the number of second lieutenants serving as public affairs officers around the world, assignments are often as dependent on availability of resources as they are upon qualifications of those assigned, at least in the Air Force. As also indicated, however, procedures utilized by the U.S. Army and the Canadian Armed Forces provide worthy examples of viable alternatives. There are, additionally, other suggestions which are worthy of consideration.

The Army and Canadian Forces policies of assigning only experienced officers to the public affairs specialty has the obvious advantage of dealing with known quantities who have first hand experience in their individual services. The combination of knowledge, maturation and experience inherent in such personnel provide the fabric from which self-confidence is patterned. The Lockhart Report agrees, saying:

Maintaining good public relations requires intelligence and good judgment. . . . The more experience that is brought to the job, the better. . . . The combination of these qualities . . . will be found in the highest character of personnel. None but this type of personnel should be assigned to public relations. (9:41)

The report's advice is not always heeded, either in or out of the uniformed services. Howard Stephenson observed, "Bismarck is said to have remarked with some scorn that journalism is the profession that requires no training. Many have echoed him in regard to public relations." (12:61)

RECOMMENDATIONS

Inexperienced junior personnel with little or no knowledge of their organizations do little to still the detractors Stephenson cites. Nielander and Miller well understood the situation and wrote, "Public relations, like charity, begins at home. A business must first understand itself." (8:6) Experienced personnel, simply by their increased knowledge of the Air Force and the world -- and how both function -- would logically skew the effectiveness curve from its present plot. The consequences of public affairs actions as enumerated by the Canadian Forces public affairs training document are well taken and just as applicable in the U.S. as they are in Canada. Adopting the U.S. Army's policy of eliminating the direct accessions of second lieutenants into the public affairs career field would contribute significantly to solving the problem, but initiating such a change is something that cannot be brought to fruition overnight. At best, that is a long range goal. In the meantime, several near-term changes are available for consideration and should be at least studied for possible implementation. Such changes include, but are not limited to, the following:

- Emulate the U.S. Army and Canadian Forces and insure that all public affairs officers have at least some active duty experience prior to being sent to DINFOS. This would require a change to the existing policy of lieutenants attending the training immediately following graduation from OTS or upon entering active duty, and may require the expenditure of some additional training funds, but the increased benefit gained from the training should more than offset any such increases. Some minimum length of active commissioned service, such as six months, should be established as a firm criterion for entrance into DINFOS to insure adherence to this stipulation.

- Take a page from the Canadian Forces Public Affairs Classification Training Compendium and establish a formal training/rating system to be used during the first year that an officer is assigned to the public affairs career field. Satisfactory completion of the period, if established as a requirement for qualifying for the 7924 fully qualified AFSC -- and added to the mandatory qualifications listed for awarding the AFSC in AFR 36-1, in paragraph 3 of that standard -- would enhance the training of the officer concerned (insuring that the officer is exposed to all areas of the specialty), more closely involve his superior in his development, and insure that more than just the passage of time is required for the award of the "fully qualified" label.

- Pursue the possibility of establishing, as part of the formal training system discussed above, a training syllabus which involves the operational aspects of the unit which the public affairs office supports. An operational flying organi-

zation takes on an entirely different hue when viewed from a snowy, windswept flightline as aircraft are being prepared for dawn launches than it presents when observed from the warmth and comfort of an office in the wing headquarters building. An air logistics center has an entirely different appearance at a work station on its production line than it has when viewed during a stroll through the work area enroute to the cafeteria. "Hands-on experience" is the goal of such programs as Education-with-Industry and the civil service's "Career Intern Program" and is the basis of the Army's policy of not accessing officers directly into the public affairs career field. Developing a program where Air Force officers would spend regularly-scheduled periods -- such as a week each month -- at various work centers accomplishing productive work-efforts would gain some of the advantages of those aforementioned programs. It would also expose the PAOs to the views, opinions and methods of other supervisors as well as providing a basis for relating those attitudes, etc., to the Air Force. The concept is not new. Nielander and Miller in 1951 wrote:

After leaving college, a student [in public relations] must expect to serve a considerable period of apprenticeship. There are numerous places . . . where he may start. In one organization it might be in the sales department, with a later transfer to the public relations department. (8:31)

- Recognize that sales and public affairs are closely related and have a written test developed to measure an individual's potential for success in sales and administer that test to all personnel applying for entrance into the public affairs career field. The results of the test could then be another factor used in evaluating applicants to the field. Commander-directed appointments to the field, since those appointments would presumably be based upon observed capabilities -- and since it is the commander's public affairs program -- could be exempt from the testing.

- Continuing the sales theme as a function of public affairs, incorporate lectures and exercises in sales in the DINFOS public affairs officers course. Expertise in the area already exists in the Air Force Recruiters' Course; lesson plans and exercises would need only to be adapted for presentation at Fort Benjamin Harrison.

- An adjunct to involving the command level in the assignment of public affairs officers and a formal tracking of their training in that specialty would be involving the commanders in regular, such as quarterly, reviews of the progress of that training. This procedure would have the dual advantages of insuring that commanders know and understand the activities of

his public affairs "trainees" as well as insuring those individuals are exposed to senior management, a "nicety" that is now too often just that, a "nicety."

- An additional benefit of increased involvement by the commander in the assignment and training of the PAOs would be to create an increased awareness on the part of such individuals (although by far not all, if for no other reason than many commanders are already extremely public affairs conscious). This, however, would logically lead to an increase in adopting the Army technique of command identification of individuals who, as at least one commander put it, "are uniquely qualified to perform as a public affairs officer." (2:)

A FINAL WORD

The goal is to insure that the best possible public affairs program is provided the United States Air Force. The American people for whom the individuals in public affairs labor are paying for the service and deserve top quality for their investment. All they are ever going to know about the Air Force will undoubtedly be provided through endeavors in which public affairs was somehow involved. Facilitating such efforts should not be short-circuited or provided less than optimum support for anything other than conscious, well-thought-out reasoning which can be logically defended. Bureaucracy has a history of not always being so magnanimous as to suboptimize its own maintenance for the good of the cause it is charged to further. Witness:

Policy, once set in operation, takes on a life of its own, defying efforts to change it even when the available information underlines the need to either rethink the policy, curtail it, or kill it. (11:22)

It may be time to rethink the overall policy of Air Force public affairs manning. Funding, identification of available resources, involvement of command, and the best mix and alternatives to all those combinations are not static features chiseled in stone, but are as dynamic as the shifting sands, seldom the same in any two situations or at any two moments in time. Nottingham's words remain applicable:

There are literally hundreds of . . . ways in which the USAF can be legitimately, and with great benefit to everybody, promoted with the public. But this is not going to happen unless a definite policy to make it happen is adopted, and unless ability and time are given to the job. (9;44)

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APPENDICES

(When any portion of assessment is completed)

TO The Public
Affairs Class-
fication Training
Compendium

PUBLIC AFFAIRS CLASSIFICATION PRE-SELECTION BOARD RECORD OF ASSESSMENT
CANDIDATE _____ ASSESSMENT PERIOD _____

TERMS OF ASSESSMENT

The above-noted candidate has been selected to undergo an initial 16 week period of assessment with DIS and DXD. On completion of this assessment period his/her performance will be reviewed by a board of officers to determine his/her suitability for transfer/acceptance into the Public Affairs (PAFF) classification. The Board will determine whether the candidate is accepted into the PAff Classification; declared unsuitable for PAff employment; or granted an additional eight weeks of assessment to correct weaknesses noted in the initial period. In the case of unsuitability the Candidate will be referred to DGPCO for career action. When an extension of assessment is granted a second board will convene at the conclusion of the supplementary assessment period to make a final decision regarding the candidate's suitability for PAff employment.

Successful candidates who are already classification qualified in another classification will be brought into the PAff classification with the Military Occupation Code (MOC) 66A. Direct entry officers and officers with no previous classification qualification will be awarded the MOC 66U (Untrained). These officers will be granted classification qualification (66A) on successful completion of Defence Information Officers School (DINFOS).

I have read and understand the terms of my assessment period with DIS and DXD.

(Date)

(Signature)

TRAINING SCHEDULE

_____ to _____ DIS 2 (Operations and Editorial)
_____ to _____ DIS 3 (NDHQ - Media Liaison)
_____ to _____ DIS 3 (Region)
_____ to _____ DXD (Orientation)

On completion of each segment of training, section supervisors will ensure that the appropriate assessment sheet is completed, the candidate is briefed on his/her performance, and the assessment is forwarded through DIS 2-2 to the next section supervisor. Candidates will not be shown their assessments. Where actual employment does not match the programmed task/skills specified this will be so indicated by the assessing officer and a separate narrative report prepared and attached to the record of assessment. When all sections of this assessment have been completed it will be returned to DIS 2-2.

ATTACHMENTS

PART I - Assessment Sheet DIS 2
PART II - Assessment Sheet DXD
PART III - DIS 3
PART IV - DIS 3 (Region) - (To be passed to DIS 3 no later than one week following assessment)

DISTRIBUTION

Cover Only - 1 copy candidate
1 copy DIS 2-2
1 Copy File

J.G. Boulet
Col
Branch Advisor

CONFIDENTIAL

(When Section 2, 3 or 4 completed)

PART 1
ASSESSMENT SHEET

Section 1

CANDIDATE _____ DIRECTORATE/SECTION DIS 2
PERIOD OF ASSESSMENT (8 weeks)

Section 2

<u>TASK/SKILL</u>	<u>KNOWLEDGE</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
Prepares written material for release to newspapers, television and radio stations.		
Must be:	Must have:	
a. Semi-skilled in writing news releases, feature articles, photo captions, radio reports, television scripts and reports in the proper format;	a. Detailed knowledge of writing techniques and format for: (1) news releases for newspapers, (2) feature articles for magazines, (3) photo and cartoon captions; and (4) radio reports.	
b. No additional skill (NAS);	b. Comprehensive knowledge of the format and content of Press Kits; and,	
c. Semi-skilled in operating a typewriter.	c. Basic knowledge of typing.	
d. Skilled in selecting slides and photographs for distribution to newspapers, magazines, wire services, internal publications and television.	Must have: (a) basic knowledge of the elements of a photograph for: (1) composition, (2) subject, (3) contrast, and, (4) size.	

.../2

Must have:

b. Basic knowledge of:

- (1) photo editing techniques,
- (2) format requirement for:
 - (a) wire services,
 - (b) newspapers,
 - (c) television, and,
 - (d) magazines.

Initiates, prepares and assists in the execution of plans designed to facilitate media coverage of DND/CF operations events and activities.

- a. Skilled in preparing draft correspondence in reply to media requests for access to DND/CF installations and facilities.
- b. Skilled in planning, organizing and conduction media visits to DND/CF installations.

Performs staff activities designed to maximize effective communication of DND/CF information themes and programs.

- a. Skilled in preparing draft communications plans in support of major CF operations, events and activities.

Must have:

- a. Basic knowledge of media requirements (print, film, radio),
- b. detailed knowledge of NDHQ/command staff interrelationships.
- c. relevant CFAQs and QR&Os.

Must have:

- a. Basic knowledge of staff communications techniques,
- b. basic knowledge of the organization of NDHQ and its primary functional elements,
- c. basic knowledge of the elements comprising effective communications strategy.

.../3

Section 3

NARRATIVE ASSESSMENT

Section 4

POINT RATING (Circle)	(1 2 3) Poor	(4 5 6) Fair	(7 8 9) Good	(10) Outstanding
--------------------------	-----------------	-----------------	-----------------	---------------------

(Date)

(Rating Officer)

On completion return to DIS STAFF COORD (DIS 2-2)

CONFIDENTIAL

(When Section 2, 3 or 4 completed)

PART II
ASSESSMENT SHEET

Section 1

CANDIDATE _____ DIRECTORATE/SECTION DIS 3

PERIOD OF ASSESSMENT (4 weeks)

Section 2

<u>TASK/SKILL</u>	<u>KNOWLEDGE</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
-------------------	------------------	-----------------

Prepares draft replies to media queries, Ministerial and general inquiries and responds verbally to telephone inquiries from the media and the general public.

Must have a detailed knowledge of:

a. material resources, i.e.:

- (1) subject files,
- (2) photographic files,
- (3) historical records (D Hist),
- (4) libraries,
- (5) news clipping services, and,
- (6) knowledgeable military and civilian sources within the department.

Skilled in assessing potential effects of replies furnished.

Section 3

NARRATIVE ASSESSMENT

Section 4

POINT RATING (Circle)	(1 2 3) Poor	(4 5 6) Fair	(7 8 9) Good	(10) Outstanding
--------------------------	-----------------	-----------------	-----------------	---------------------

(Date)

(Rating Officer)

On completion return to DIS STAFF COORD (DIS 2-2)

CONFIDENTIAL

(When Section 2, 3 or 4 completed)

PART III

ASSESSMENT SHEET

Section 1

CANDIDATE _____ DIRECTORATE/SECTION DIS 3/DND01

PERIOD OF ASSESSMENT (2 weeks)

Section 2

<u>TASK/SKILL</u>	<u>KNOWLEDGE</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
Assists in the development of community relations programs.	Must have :	
	a. Knowledge of	
Must be semi-skilled in:	(1) military and civilian community interests, and,	
a. assessing military and civilian attitudes towards each other; and,	(2) any sensitivities which may exist between the military and civilian communities, such as:	
	(a) noise from low-flying aircraft, and,	
	(b) base or unit reductions.	
b. Developing community relations programs to encourage mutual acceptance within the military and civilian communities.	b. Knowledge of the content of an effective community relations program, i.e.:	
	(1) the requirements of speakers bureaus,	
	(2) the military resources which may be utilized in a community relations program, eg:	
	(a) sports facilities, and,	
	(b) bands.	
	(3) communications resources in the community, i.e.:	
	(a) community leaders,	
	(b) service groups and clubs,	

b. (3)

(c) newspapers

(d) radio, and,

(e) television.

Section 3

NARRATIVE ASSESSMENT

Section 4

POINT RATING (Circle)	(1 2 3) Poor	(4 5 6) Fair	(7 8 9) Good	(10) Outstanding
--------------------------	-----------------	-----------------	-----------------	---------------------

(Date)

(Rating Officer)

On completion return to DIS STAFF COORD (DIS 2-2)

CONFIDENTIAL

(When Section 2, 3 or 4 completed)

PART IV

ASSESSMENT SHEET

Section 1

CANDIDATE _____ DIRECTORATE/SECTION DXD

PERIOD OF ASSESSMENT (2 weeks)

Section 2

<u>TASK/SKILL</u>	<u>KNOWLEDGE</u>	<u>COMMENTS</u>
Assists in the development displays for public exhibition.	Basic knowledge of resources which are available as display material, in:	
Researches audio/visual material for exhibitions and display.	(a) the Directorate of Exhibitions and Displays (DXD), (b) operational equipment from units, and, (c) training aids, i.e.: (1) cut away models, and, (2) "mock-ups". (d) other government agencies.	

Section 3

NARRATIVE ASSESSMENT

Section 4

POINT RATING (Circle)	(1 2 3) Poor	(4 5 6) Fair	(7 8 9) Good	(10) Outstanding
--------------------------	-----------------	-----------------	-----------------	---------------------

(Date)

(Rating Officer)

On completion return to DIS STAFF COORD (DIS 2-2)

CONFIDENTIAL

(When any portion of assessment is completed)

PUBLIC AFFAIRS CLASSIFICATION
PRE-SELECTION BOARD RECORD OF ASSESSMENT

CANDIDATE _____ ASSESSMENT PERIOD _____

TERMS OF REFERENCE

The above-noted candidate has been selected to undergo a period of orientation/assessment with the Directorate of Information Services. On completion of this assessment period his/her performance will be reviewed by a board of officers to determine his/her suitability for transfer/acceptance into the Public Affairs (PAFF) classification. The Board will determine whether the candidate is accepted into the PAff Classification; declared unsuitable for PAff employment; or granted an additional period of assessment to correct weaknesses noted in the initial period. In the case of unsuitability the Candidate will be referred to DGPCO for career action. When an extension of assessment is granted a second board will convene at the conclusion of the supplementary assessment period to make a final decision regarding the candidate's suitability for PAff employment.

Successful candidates who are already classification qualified in another classification will be brought into the PAff classification with the Military Occupation Code (MOC) 66A. Direct entry officers and officers with no previous classification qualification will be awarded the MOC 66U (Untrained). These officers will be granted classification qualification (66A) on successful completion of Defence Information Officers School (DINFOS).

I have read and understand the terms of my orientation/assessment period with DIS.

(Date)

(Signature)

TRAINING SCHEDULE

_____ to _____ Orientation
_____ to _____ DIS 2
_____ to _____ DIS 3
_____ to _____ DIS 3 (Region)

On completion of each segment of training, section supervisors will ensure that the appropriate assessment sheet is completed, the candidate is briefed on his/her performance, and the assessment is forwarded to DIS 3-4 through the section supervisor. Candidates will be shown their assessments.

ATTACHMENTS

Sample Assessment Sheet

J.G. Boulet
Col
Branch Advisor

DISTRIBUTION

Cover Only - 1 Copy - candidate
1 Copy - DIS 3-4
1 Copy - File

CONFIDENTIAL

ANNEX B
TO 4500-13/10 (DIS)
DATED 31 Aug 83

ASSESSMENT FORM

PAFF RECLASSIFICATION CANDIDATES

SIN: _____ RANK: _____ NAME: _____

SUB-SECTION: _____ PERIOD: _____

(Supervisors will rate candidates under each of the following sections.)

EMPLOYMENT - (Statement of employment for period indicated)

ASSESSMENT OF QUALITIES

Attitude -
Initiative -
Performance Under Stress -
Accuracy -
Punctuality (deadlines) -
Logic -

Not Observed	Acceptable	Not Accepta.

ASSESSMENT OF PERFORMANCE

OVERALL IMPRESSION

Acceptable / Not Acceptable

(Candidate)

(Date)

(Section Head)

(Supervisor)

(Date)

(Training Officer)

Qualities - Standards

<u>Attitude:</u>	Candidate must demonstrate a positive approach to situations and tasks regardless of complexity.
<u>Initiative:</u>	Candidate must demonstrate a willingness to seek solutions to problems through research and personal application.
<u>Performance Under Stress</u> :	Candidate must be able to function effectively during periods of increased workload and/or changing priorities.
<u>Accuracy:</u>	Candidate must clearly demonstrate attention to detail and thoroughness in research and work methods.
<u>Punctuality:</u>	Candidate must meet assigned deadlines within the constraints imposed by requirements for outside input and changing priorities.
<u>Logic:</u>	Candidate must demonstrate the ability to analyse problems, organize and develop sound solutions.